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INTRODUCTION 
The lessons from the XB-70A program that have been selected for discussion are 
only a few of the things that have been learned during the program. These things will 
certainly apply to the supersonic transport (SST). In some cases they will apply to 
any large airplane, and in a few cases they will  apply to almost any airplane. The 
XB-70 is a very valuable research airplane; there is no other airplane in the world of 
similar size that can fly in the same speed environment. Many of its design features 
were pushing the state of the art ;  therefore, both positive and negative results were  
obtained, providing validation or  correlation of design prediction techniques. It also 
provided information on operational factors applicable to a large supersonic aircraft. 
The program has been expensive in money, time, and personal sacrifice, but i f  the 
knowledge gained from the xB-70A test program makes it possible to avoid even one 
catastrophic SST accident, the program will more than pay for itself. 
DESCRIPTION OF AIRPLANE AND TEST PROGRAM 
The XB-70A (fig, 1) is a large, delta-wingy supersonic airplane with dual vertical- 
tail surfaces, a movable canard surface with trailing-edge flaps, and a movable nose 
ramp to provide acceptable visibility at low speed and reduced drag at high speed. The 
airplane has retractable landing gear and wing tips that are folded downward to improve 
directional stability at transonic and supersonic speeds. It is 189 feet long with a wing 
span of 105 feet. The maximum taxi weight is 542,000 pounds, and the takeoff gross 
weight for most flights is approximately 532,000 pounds, The airplane is crewed by 
two pilots on experimental or research flights, which have been flown at speeds up to 
Mach 3 . 0  and altitudes above 70,000 feet. 
The flight program began on September 21, 1964, under U. S. A i r  Force direction 
and funding. Since March 29, 1967, a joint NASA-USAF program has been directed 
North American Rockwell and General Electric, since the beginning of the program. 
c and primarily funded by NASA. Flight support has been provided by the contractors 
The breakdown of flights and flight hours is shown in the following table: 
Both 
Airplane 1 Airplane 2 airplanes 
Flights 78 46 124 
Flight hours 149:13 92 :22 241:35 
Supersonic flight hours 55:41 47:17 102:58 
Flight hours at Mach 2.0 or  above 23:08 27:18 50:26 
Flight hours at Mach 2.5 or above 5:55 16:34 22:29 
Flight hours at Mach 3.0 or  above :02 1 :46 1:48 
The test programs covered many areas of interest. Some of the most significant 
are : 
Stability and control 
Airplane handling characteristics on the ground and in flight 
Performance of airplane, engines, inlet, and systems 
Structural loads on airplane and landing gear 
Noise and sonic boom 
Ground effects during takeoff and landing 
Response to turbulence 
Modal control and gust alleviation 
Operational characteristics 
DISCUSSION 
Realism in Design and Operation 
One of the most significant lessons from the XB-70 should be the need for con- 
servative realism in designing and operating the SST. The XB-70 was originally con- 
ceived as having intercontinental range. The operational experience to date in con- 
junction with onboard recorded data indicates that the design range may have been 
missed by more than 25 percent; the reasons a re  many. Using the then best available 
methods of interpreting wind-tunnel data, the contractor along with some A i r  Force 
and NASA people overestimated the lift-to-drag ratio, underestimated the transonic 
drag, and overestimated the inlet performance that could be obtained under practical 
operational conditions. Also, there were  necessary but unplanned increases in airplane 
empty weight. The result was a large reduction in performance. 
Flight Character is tics Versus Wind- Tunne 1 P r edi c tions 
Although agreement between flight and predicted airplane stability and control charac- 4 
teristics was realized in most instances, some of the stability characteristics and hand- 
ling qualities were unlike the wind-tunnel predictions. For example, the airplane exhi- 
bits excessive adverse yaw due to aileron input at all flight conditions, but this charac- 
teristic was not predicted for a large portion of the flight regime. 
can be inadvertently generated at some speeds, and the pilot may not be aware of them 
because under some conditions the transverse accelerations in the cockpit are low, 
Large sideslip angles 
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making the pilot relatively insensitive to directional motions. Also, the airplane 
riding qualities are  less than desirable under turbulent-air conditions. Much additional 
wind-tunnel testing has been done by NASA during the XB-70 test program in an attempt 
to correlate wind-tunnel data with the flight-test results. Some differences between 
the model and the airplane are the result of aeroelasticity. Other differences are due 
to scale effect. Correction factors validated during the test program have brought 
these data into closer agreement. Hopefully, as a result of these studies, there is 
now a better basis upon which to make predictions for the SST. Since it appears that 
the profit margin for the SST will not be high enough to afford large errors  in pre- 
dictions , even with improved methods of prediction it seems that some allowances 
must be made for minor miscalculations and for the unknown factors that always influ- 
ence a new airplane. 
Enroute Atmospheric Predictions 
Another thing that is not new but has certainly been well illustrated is the need for 
accurate atmospheric predictions along the flight route and especially in the acceler- 
ation area. On the most recent XB-70 flight the temperature at the acceleration 
altitude was estimated to be 8" C to 10" C warmer than standard-day conditions. In- 
flight data and the performance obtained indicated that the temperature predictions were 
very close and the fuel usage was considerably higher than had been originally planned, 
using charts for standard-day conditions. Figure 2 shows the standard-day fuel-usage 
predictions versus the actual conditions for a segment of the flight. A s  can be seen, 
the fuel remaining was 14,000 pounds low at the northwest turning point and the speed 
was only Mach 2.40 instead of the predicted Mach 2.52. Temperatures warmer than 
those for a standard day are  bad enough when known and accounted for as on this flight, 
but if they occur without being predicted, there is a good likelihood that fuel reserves 
will  be dangerously low at the destination. In addition, turbulence has been encountered 
even at altitudes above 60,000 feet, and turbulence is a significant factor in reducing 
supersonic performance. The predictions of turbulence encounters have not been 
accurate on many flights. 
Variable-Position Nose Ramp 
The XB-7OA nose ramp (fig. 3) can be operated at indicated airspeeds of up to 
560 knots. This has been found to be extremely valuable. It provides the pilot an 
opportunity to have forward visibility and reduces the possibility of collision, therefore 
lessening anxiety during any subsonic operation and even during supersonic speeds. 
The airplane has been flown to speeds in excess of Mach 2.50 on numerous flights with 
the windshield ramp down (best visibility). 
caused by the lower climb-speed schedule in this configuration, 560 KIAS versus the 
normal 575 KIAS, and by the increase in windshield drag. The improved view of the 
natural horizon with the nose ramp down is a big aid in flying the airplane and gives 
the pilot more time to devote to cockpit duties other than instrument flying. The 
capability of rapidly operating the XB-70A nose ramp up or  down over most of the 
flight envelope is very desirable. It enables an occasional "quick look" when desired, 
Certainly some reduction in visibility is acceptable to obtain less drag and improved 
performance at high speed, but those who feel that forward visibility is completely 
unnecessary during acceleration and cruise are  not in agreement with the XB-70 pilots. 
There is a small performance penalty 
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Cockpit Instruments 
The XB-70 has vertical-tape flight instruments and round-dial engine instruments. 
It would be nice to say that the XB-70 pilots have concluded that vertical-tape flight 
instruments a re  better than round-dial flight instruments ; however , that is not the 
case. The pilots seem to be about evenly split in their preferences between tapes and 
round dials. I have flown tapes in simulators, an experimental F-102, C-1411s, and 
the XB-70 and have flown round dials in B-52's, B-58's, F-l04's, C-130Ts, and many 
other types of airplanes. A satisfactory job can be done with either type, but I prefer 
round dials, since trends are more easily recognized and possibly because of past 
experience and training. A feature of the XB-70 and some other airplanes is the 
digital readout of airspeed and altitude. 
flying. A digital readout of Mach number should also be provided. One of the very 
desirable engine instruments is an exhaust gas temperature (EGT) gage with a warning 
light on the face to call attention to an over-temperature condition. Early in the test 
program the EGT gages installed did not have this warning-light feature, and several 
engines had to be removed for inspection when pilots failed to immediately see an 
over-temperature condition, Since the installation of gages with warning lights , there 
have been numerous occasions of over-temperature alerts to the pilots. The gages 
have paid for themselves many times over. A yaw or sideslip instrument will probably 
be required as will a total temperature gage. If the design cruise speed causes the 
total temperature to always be near the limiting temperature, a warning light or  bell 
will have to be provided, Prolonged exceeding of the limiting temperature is probably 
as critical as exceeding the limiting speed. 
This is extremely helpful in precise instrument 
There have been several publicized statements to the effect that "it is very dif- 
ficult to hold a constant altitude at high speeds in the XB-70. 
have an autopilot, and there is no question about it being more difficult to maintain 
altitude with the XB-70 than with a subsonic jet transport, because small angular 
changes in pitch attitude result in large rates of altitude change. At Mach 3.0 and 
70,000 feet altitude, an attitude change of 1 " causes the rate of climb to change approx- 
imately 3000 feet per minute. 
to the longitudinal control system inasmuch as the trace of elevator force during a 
sonic-boom run (fig. 4) shows that a high frequency of small inputs was required by the 
pilot. 
Mach 2.51. 
stallation of an attitude director indicator with a pitch scale of doubled sensitivity. The 
original instrument was difficult to read within 1/4 O ; whereas, a more sensitive instru- 
ment (fig. 5) provided greater resolution and ease of maintaining altitude. A cockpit 
modification (fig. 6) has been made recently to allow in-flight selection of attitude- 
indicator sensitivities ranging from 2:l  (2" on the instrument versus 1" outside) up to 
5:l. Only a few flights have been flown with the modified instrument, but preliminary 
results indicate that a selection in the sensitivity range between 3:l and 4:l will pro- 
bably be more satisfactory for high-speed flying. The attitude director indicator 
(fig. 5) also has a 1 O : l  vertical pitch scale to the left of the attitude ball, but that 
appears to be oversensitive. 
The airplane does not 
The difficulty in holding altitude is probably due in part 
The same figure also shows that altitude was being held relatively constant at 
The improved altitude holding capability was attributed primarily to in- 
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Overspeed Operation 
The problem of overspeeds deserves serious consideration. To obtain optimum 
performance, most supersonic airplanes will need to operate near maximum placard 
speeds during the climb, cruise, and descent. 
to and then climbed at 560 KLAS (nose ramp down) or  575 KIAS (nose ramp up). The 
pilot is faced with the task of keeping the speed near maximum placard to improve 
performance, but not above placard because of design considerations. The planned 
climb schedule has been inadvertently exceeded from 5 to 10 knots indicated airspeed 
on a number of XB-70 flights. Although deviations are small, it is virtually impossible 
to hold an exact climb schedule. The most frequent excursions occur at the completion 
of the constant-altitude transonic acceleration and during the initial transition to a 
constant indicated airspeed climb schedule. Most pilots begin a gradual pullup to 
phase into the climb when 15 to 20 KIAS below the desired climb speed, but overspeeds 
still sometimes occur. No warning device is installed on the XB-70, but for an SST 
it seems that the warning bell or light should be set at least 10 to 15 KIAS and Mach 0.05 
below the placard limit speeds or the maximum speed will  be exceeded and cause the 
warning to be triggered on numerous flights, 
The XB-70 is normally accelerated 
Inlet Operation 
The XB-70 uses a system of movable inlet panels and airflow bypass doors to 
control the air being supplied to the engines. These inlet panels and bypass doors 
provide a means of bringing the normal shock wave inside the inlet at speeds above 
Mach 2 .0  to improve inlet efficiency. With the normal shock inside the inlet, it is 
considered to be "started;" when the normal shock moved outside the inlet, it is con- 
sidered to be "unstarted. The normal shock position is sensitive to speed, angle of 
attack, sideslip, and engine speed. The method of controlling the shock position with 
the XB-70 is semiautomatic and the switches , controls , and gages (figs. 7 and 8) require 
much attention from the copilot. When an inlet "unstart" occurs, the XB-70 experiences 
airframe buffet which ranges from light at Mach 2.2 to heavy at speeds above Mach 2.7. 
Sometimes the airframe buffet is accompanied by engine stalls and/or possible inlet 
buzz. Many "unstarts" have been experienced during the test program. Some were 
planned and others were unintentional. It usually takes from 5 to 10 seconds for the 
copilot to "restart" the inlet; therefore, the flight crew endures the buffet for a short 
time. The paying passenger is not likely to willingly endure that type of buffet more 
than once. 
automatic, and very fast in returning an inlet to normal operation after an "unstart. 
The SST inlet control and inlet "restarting" systems must be reliable, 
F 1 ying Qualities 
The XB-70 has some undesirable flying qualities, such as the yaw due to aileron, 
development of excess yaw under certain conditions, and the negative dihedral effect 
at high speeds, but the airplane has excellent longitudinal and directional restoring 
characteristics. 
flying qualities; however, the system can be safely turned off in any flight regime. All  
takeoffs and landings on the early flights were  made with the augmentation off. In- 
tentional sideslips, releases from sideslips , pitch pulses, and wind-up turn stability 
Turning off the augmentation (dampers) results in a deterioration of 
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maneuvers have been routinely accomplished at speeds as high as Mach 2.90 with all 
the augmentation off. On several recent flights, after the pitch augmentation was 
turned off, the airplane was flown "hands off" during phugoid tests for periods of over 
5 minutes at Mach 2.50 and approximately 62,000 feet. 
banking tendencies through the rudder pedals, with left rudder to command right rolls 
and right rudder to command left rolls because of the negative dihedral effect at that 
speed. Using reasonable pilot effort, the SST should be capable of flight with all 
augmentation off throughout its entire speed envelope. 
The pilot controlled minor 
Deceleration and Descent 
The importance of proper planning and execution of the deceleration and descent 
from high-speed cruise should not be underestimated. The slowdown and descent 
from a Mach 2.70 cruise flight will start  200 nautical miles or  more from the desti- 
nation in order to become subsonic at the proper distance and altitude to allow inte- 
gration with the subsonic jet traffic. Receipt of the traffic clearance and the initiatioii 
of the slowdown and descent cannot be delayed. With a speed of approximately 27 
nautical miles per minute, the pilot does not have the opportunity to "standby" while 
awaiting the clearance. He should have that clearance well before reaching the dece- 
leration point. The flight path must be flown in a manner to minimize sonic booms, 
which means that the speed will probably be at Mach 1.10 or below by the time an 
altitude of 35,000 feet is reached. I flew a fairly typical deceleration and descent in 
the XB-70 during a 59-minute flight from Edwards AFB, California, to Carswell AFB, 
Texas. The slowdown started from Mach 2.70 at 64,000 feet altitude over Lubbock, 
Texas, and the airplane arrived over Carswell AFB at 5,000 feet above the ground. 
The sequence of events for the flight was as follows: 
Time to Carswell, 
minutes 
:16 
: 12 
:09 
:08 
:05.5 
:02.5 
:oo 
Speed 
2.70 Mach 
2.00 Mach 
1.50 Mach 
1.40 Mach 
1.00 Mach 
.90 Mach 
400 KIAS 
Altitude , 
feet 
64,000 
50,000 
30,000 
20,000 
5,000 
Remarks 
Lubbock, Texas - 238 n. mi. 
to Carswell AFB. Thrust 
reduced from afterburner 
to military power. 
Decelerating and descending ~ 
Decelerating and descending 
90 n. mi. from Carswell AFB. 
Thrust reduced below military 
power. 
Decelerating and descending 
50 n. mi. from Carswell 
AFB. 
Carswell AFB. 
Descending, 25 n. mi. from 
Over Carswell AFB. 
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The XB-70 has certain engine and inlet restrictions that prevent reducing power to idle 
thrust at high Mach numbers. The SST may not be faced with such restrictions and 
may be provided with deceleration devices such as air brakes or in-flight thrust re- 
versers. These will improve the slowdown capability, but the slowdown will still re- 
main a maneuver that requires proper planning and execution. 
Landing-Gear Reliability 
Experience has shown that the SST landing gear should be relatively simple in design 
and operation. The landing gear on the number 1 XB-70 has failed to retract or has 
incurred malfunctions that prevented retraction on 7 of the 78 flights. The number 2 
XB-70 had a similar record of malfunctions. 
landing gear did not retract completely on the first attempt, but on one or  more sub- 
sequent attempts it did lock up and allow the flight to continue as planned. There have 
been slower-than-normal retraction cycles and there have been cases where usage 
of the emergency landing-gear extension system was required in order to get the landing 
gear "down and locked. ' I  Since the time of the early XB-70 flights, there have been 
special emergency switches installed to allow bypassing certain protective relays, and 
a special hydraulic system has been added to provide redundancy to the nose-gear 
extension system. The XB-70 cannot be landed without probable catastrophic failure 
if the nose gear fails to extend; therefore, bailout would be required. Obviously, 
bailout is not the solution to a serious SST landing-gear malfunction. If possible, the 
retraction system should use simple mechanical linkages and avoid large numbers of 
sequence valves and micro-switches that can get out of adjustment and prevent re- 
traction. An even more important requirement is to have a reliable landing-gear 
extension system. The emergency extension system should utilize the "free fall" 
method, since even dual hydraulic systems can fail and cause landing-gear problems, 
as when both XB-70 utility systems failed (fig. 9) and a "tiptoe" landing resulted. The 
emergency system should also have a pneumatic or hydraulic backup capability and be 
one in which crew members have high confidence. 
There have been flights on which the 
Hydraulic -Sys tem Operation 
There have been numerous hydraulic-system leaks o r  failures during the test pro- 
gram. Initially there were hydraulic pressure gages but no hydraulic quantity gages 
in the cockpit. There was strong pilot insistence on the quantity gages, and they were 
installed before the first flight. They have proved invaluable by providing cockpit 
knowledge of hydraulic leaks or  fluid transfer between hydraulic systems. After sev- 
eral leaks were experienced, a 30-gallon hydraulic reservoir , an electric pump, and 
a hydraulic replenishing system were  installed to allow in-flight reservicing of a low 
hydraulic system. The system has been used several times to prevent depletion of a 
hydraulic system and the resulting cavitation of the hydraulic pump and contamination 
of the hydraulic system. It also reduces the need for an emergency landing. The 
system was paid for on its first usage, since the cost of overhauling the hydraulic 
pumps in a failed system is approximately equal to the cost of installing the replen- 
ishing system. The present hydraulic panel is shown in figure 10. The SST should 
have hydraulic quantity gages and some type of replenishing system in addition to the 
normal pressure gages. 
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Approach and Landing 
The XB-70 is not a difficult airplane to land under the ideal circumstances provided 
at Edwards Ai r  Force Base,. It has excellent Speed stability on the final approach and 
has a very strong ground cushion. The speed stability and the rapid engine response 
provided through the electric throttle system allows airspeed to be held easily within 
2 knots of aim speed. It can be and has been landed from a 3" approach path but is 
more comfortable when flown on a 1.5" to 2.0"  slope. The normal light-gross-weight 
approach speed of approximately 200 knots is much too high for an SST and causes 
some apprehension when maneuvering from an offset approach to line up with the run- 
way. Judgment of flare and touchdown altitude is more difficult because of the pilot's 
height above the ground and because of the high approach speed. 
proach and landing speed of the SST, the easier will be the landing task. 
responds adversely to turbulence , and the pilot's workload increases significantly 
when landing under turbulent conditions. 
The lower the ap- 
The XB-70 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The North American Rockwell XB-70 is a very valuable research vehicle that has 
allowed important data to be gathered by NASA and the U. S. A i r  Force that are 
particularly applicable to the SST program. Its combination of high speed and large 
size is unmatched anywhere in the world. The extremely reliable 5-93 General 
Electric engines, although never previously flown, have been a strong factor in the 
success of the program. tr, 
The items covered in this paper represent only a small part of the knowledge 
gained from the test program. Many reports have already been published on the 
program and NASA has other reports being prepared for publication. The Boeing 
Airplane Company and the Federal Aviation Agency have worked closely with the 
XB-70 test team throughout the program and have full access to all XB-70 data. 
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